Spanish left in transition: Interview with Anticapitalistas

by Ánxel Testas • Published 30 October 2023

Political developments in the Spanish state have been of intense interest to the left since the explosion of the Indignados movement in 2011. In the aftermath of the months-long occupations of public squares, a new political project emerged onto the scene, Podemos. While it started as a coalition between well-known media personalities and the far left, Podemos quickly achieved success and grew, alongside SYRIZA, into Europe’s most prominent neo-reformist organisation. Marxist Left Review and Socialist Alternative were highly critical[1] of the Podemos leadership and their populist approach to politics, which quickly moved to smash any radicalism within their organisation. Clearly, this was not a party that could seriously challenge the ruling class or their system. Yet as with SYRIZA, we were open to a range of tactical approaches to the new situation created by the rise of these new parties, insofar as the size, strength and political experience of revolutionaries was being developed in a clear and principled opposition to the reformist leaders.

We are therefore happy to be publishing this interview with Ánxel Testas of Anticapitalistas, the largest Marxist organisation in the Spanish state. It was conducted following his visit to our Marxism conference this year, and reflects on the questions raised there with honesty and insight, from the perspective of an organisation that is continuing to fight to build the left and influence events as best they can. Of course, Anxel’s views are his own, and are not necessarily shared by the editors or Socialist Alternative.

At the time it was formed Podemos was an inspiration to many on the international left. It seemed to signal a new possibility for consolidating the left and anti-austerity politics generated by the global financial crises. What was your role in the process of establishing the party, and what did you hope to accomplish?

At the end of 2013, after two years of intense mobilisations in the streets following the outbreak of Indignados movement, a movement whose banner was a strong critique of the party system, there was a paradoxical situation: the struggles, despite their intensity, had not achieved victories and, on the other hand, the political landscape remained blocked. In 2014 there were European elections that heralded a timid rise of a United Left (a post-Eurocommunist organisation with an anti-neoliberal slant) that had undertaken a slight renewal. However, in Galicia and Catalonia (two historical nationalities within the Spanish state) new electoral experiences of the anti-capitalist left (the CUP in the Catalan case) and left-wing nationalism (Anova in the Galician case, together with a very small United Left) had achieved significant successes, and the experience of Syriza was also an important point of reference for us.

We detected the growing interest in politics (albeit in diffuse terms, between electoral and radical) after the mobilisations had stopped, and we tried to set up different initiatives from our limited forces, thinking more in the municipal terrain where there were important concentrations of activists where it would be easier to start. On a larger scale, we did not have a political agreement with Izquierda Unida [IU, United Left] to do something similar to the French Front de Gauche or Syriza, because of their refusal not to subordinate themselves to social liberalism (now it is hardly remembered, but in Andalusia, the biggest region in Spain, they participated in the regional government together with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party]) and there were no anti-capitalist organisations of sufficient scale for an anti-capitalist front (nor with the will to relate to real mass processes). For us it was fundamental to be able to make a leap in the political and social organisation of the movement (and within this broader process, the strengthening of our organisation).

At the end of 2013 the idea arose of trying to carry out an electoral experiment outside Izquierda Unida for the European elections (which, being a single constituency, allowed for experimentation), taking advantage of the increasingly well-known figure of Pablo Iglesias on television and trying to seek agreements with forces in the historic nationalities (which was not achieved). Despite this, we decided to give it a try, with us (Izquierda Anticapitalista, a revolutionary Marxist group of around 500 militants with a presence in different cities in Spain) and a group of activists and teachers, closely linked to the student movement in Madrid, around Pablo Iglesias (and immediately afterwards, also around Iñigo Errejón) as the promoters. Podemos was born, albeit diffusely, on the left and in competition with the reformist left, but without being a clearly anti-capitalist project.

Expectations soared within days of the public launch of the initiative in January. In February there were already mass meetings in almost every city in the state, organised in the form of circles. The social composition of these circles is much more working-class than that of the active nuclei of the Indignados movement, but activists from social movements, trade unionists and experienced left-wing cadres were generally absent. Our role was fundamental in generating a national structure to sustain the initiative, but the truth is that there is a logic of overflow in which it is enough for one person to make a meeting public on Facebook for it to fill up.

Our objectives were escalating at the same speed as the process was accelerating: from setting up a broad and plural political nucleus that aspires to electoral representation with a radical shock program, we were moving on to aspiring to set up a mass workers’ party (with us being the militant nucleus of a radical wing) with possibilities of reaching the government (in June the polls showed Podemos as the first force), and to initiate a process of rupture with the 78 regime[2] and with the Europe of austerity, hoping to open a front together with Greece.

The party leadership campaigned against your existence as an organised tendency within Podemos very early on. Can you explain why Iglesias and his clique were so hostile to independent revolutionary organisation, and how you responded? What impact did this red-baiting have on the inner life of Podemos broadly, and your own position within it?

The political and strategic conception of the Podemos leadership (self-constituted at the beginning around the media power of Pablo Iglesias) had two tributaries: post-Marxist populism via Latin America, and Eurocommunism: direct mass leader relations without intermediaries, the primacy of taking positions in the state, the acceptance of bourgeois institutional frameworks and, in the end, the postponement or direct refusal of the possibility of a socialist transformation of society led by the working class. These tendencies reached here paroxysmal and exaggerated levels: degradation of politics to communication and a vertical, militantly anti-pluralist and plebiscitary (click-through) organisational model. The grassroots structures lost all power, which was handed over to a network of arrogant and ridiculous General Secretaries who reproduced the superficial characteristics of the leader. The circles had no tasks beyond sticking up posters, nor economic resources or political decision-making capacity, they were a place for cheering the leadership.

This meant attacking the only organised and public organisation that existed in Podemos, and it was done viciously, taking advantage of the prejudices against political parties that existed in some of the people who participated. At that time, many militants of social and political movements, both of communist tradition and the autonomists, who had fought against the launching of Podemos, entered directly into the apparatus, blindly accepting the leadership and the dominant theses, and formed the cadres and elected deputies of the organisation.

The impact on the internal life of Podemos was devastating, and in the long run a historical and generational catastrophe. The opportunity was missed to set up a genuine mass organisation – today there are hardly any activists who are not directly employed by the party. It generated a very arid terrain not only for our construction but also for minimum frameworks of debate, work and democratic culture. Thousands of people who went through the circles will never return to active politics.

As for our position as Anticapitalistas, it forced us to be very defensive and to strengthen ourselves politically, organisationally and materially. We also remained outside the national leadership (although it was never a democratic collegiate space) and we remained internally in a life increasingly limited to public current fights around the internal primaries and within the parliamentary groups. Without internal life and without strong social struggles, with practically all the young people outside the circles, we found it hard to identify fertile ground for growth and development of our tendency.

Given what you’ve described about the party structures becoming increasingly centralised and hollow, can you explain what participation in Podemos looked like? And how did you balance that with work outside the organisation: in street protests, workplaces, on campuses?

Our presence in Podemos was on three fronts: 1) in the circles, where it was rapidly dying out, in part we were expelled and in part we abandoned them after only the fanatical supporters of the leadership remained; 2) in the institutional spaces where we had a presence; 3) in the internal life of the currents. These last two spheres, although totally fragmented by currents and with hardly any effective participation from below (although in the moments of activation of internal fights, hundreds of people and thousands of supporters were dragged along), had an outstanding public repercussion, turning the internal life into a public sphere of debates (through networks, articles, our own acts), but without any joint action. It should be made clear that we headed broad currents grouped under Anticapitalistas, but we were always careful to separate very clearly what Anticapitalistas was (a Marxist revolutionary organisation) and what those currents were. On the other side, there were the currents of Pablo Iglesias and Iñigo Errejón, which were only formally active in the primaries, but had no public or open organisational reality (they were more networks of internal and elected officials).

But it was not all Podemos. In 2015 there were municipal elections and elections in most of the autonomous communities (the Spanish state is divided into 17 autonomous communities). Podemos did not participate with its own brand in the municipal elections (for fear that it would detract their strength for the national elections), but this prudence opened up a more fertile field of hundreds of very different alliances at the local, and even autonomous community, levels. To give two examples: in the city of Madrid we presented ourselves in the municipal primaries on a list with activists from social movements and autonomy in a space that Podemos later joined in extremis in a negotiation from above (this platform won the government of the city); in Galicia the same thing happened at the regional level. Municipalism greatly enriched what was considered to be “the movement for change”, which included parties such as Podemos and Izquierda Unida, and multiple spaces and platforms that could in turn contain these organisations and others, along with more people, with very different power relations and relative weights depending on the locality.

In terms of activity outside this “space of change”, militant activity in general was much reduced. First of all, if we have already said that social struggles had begun to decline before the launch of Podemos (and could not be attributed to it), the growth of Podemos, the crisis of the party regime and of the monarchy (also due to the Catalan independence movement), the victory of Syriza in Greece and the achievement of government in the country’s big cities, generated a rapid pendulum swing from, to quote Daniel Bensaïd, social illusion to electoral illusion. There was great expectation as to what could be achieved in this area. On the other hand, the leadership of Podemos made a very important contribution to crystallising this mood. Moreover, the economic situation had relatively stabilised and the hardest years of austerity were behind us, and the trade unions (from the majority to the most combative) played a very secondary and passive role during those years.

We used the slogan “one foot in the institutions, a thousand in the streets” and we also recovered the old Chilean slogan of “fight, create, popular power”, insisting that a party-movement was necessary to strengthen itself socially and politically in order to be able to aspire to sustain a clash against the ruling class and its political regime. However, we did not have the strength to make this turn and the absence of social and trade union struggles created an absence of levers on which to rely.

As for our specific tasks, we tried to maintain and support the struggles that broke out from time to time, with the idea of lending resources and encouraging workers’ self-organisation (against the fashion of the time, at the height of political communication and the narcissism of public officials, who went to demonstrations to take pictures of themselves). At the youth level we launched our own organisation (Abrir Brecha: Open the Gap) in the face of the growing disaffection of young leftists for professional politics, but the truth is that the situation on campus, after the defeat of the strong student movement of 2007–2009, was also very passive.

The one exception was the explosive rise of the women’s movement, which brought about major change but remained outside party politics.

How did Anticapitalistas respond to the decision by Podemos to form a coalition government with PSOE?

When that decision was taken, we formalised our exit from Podemos. However, it was already an exit that had been foreseen since the outcome of the 2019 elections and Podemos’ line in the subsequent general elections. In May 2019 municipal elections took place again, in which we managed to force the most left-wing sectors of IU to launch joint candidacies in some places (and in some places also including Podemos, but as a three-party agreement with Anticapitalistas as an actor of its own), with the idea of having an institutional wedge in a new cycle that would already be different, focused on tasks of mobilisation and getting rooted in the working class. However, almost no candidacy surpassed 5 percent (the limit for representation) and this put a brake on the constitution of a radical pole with an institutional presence, with the sectors furthest to the left leaving very weakened. The cycle was closed and the entry into government was the culmination of a whole series of previous political capitulations: the only way to achieve anything (and it was becoming less and less what was aspired to) was to govern with the PSOE, which was once again an ally. This is the new mantra of the bulk of the Spanish parliamentary left.

The government that was formed bore no resemblance whatsoever to the Latin American governments of Chávez or the first Evo [Morales], or even to a government of a social democracy in its youthful phase like that of Olof Palme. It was a government of senile social liberalism committed to capitalist management and the diktats of European finance. It is true that it opened up expectations in certain sectors at a time of shrinking horizons, which favoured the integration of organised nuclei of the movements into the ministerial orbit, what Gramsci calls the “extended state”. However, its balance sheet is underwhelming: today the working class has no more social strength or better living conditions than when it began, and the door has been opened to a government with the extreme right within it.

Would you say that this experience has strengthened Anticapitalistas, politically or numerically? In retrospect, would you have done anything differently?

It is complicated to evaluate our involvement using only one parameter: Anticapitalistas is much stronger in public knowledge and as a political current with real insertion in national political life. We have gained in capacity for tactical development, in political-organisational experience of our cadres, in communicative skills and geographical expansion, in capacity for our own and original theoretical-practical elaboration within and in dialogue with international Marxism, in polemic capacity with other political currents. But if we measure it from the potential possibilities that opened up with the emergence of Podemos, the scenario leaves much to be desired. We gave a strong political battle, on a scale of hundreds of thousands of people, but we did not have sufficient strength, capacity or alliances, nor were we accompanied by a level of confrontation and social struggle sufficient to take the political leadership of the process away from Iglesias and his team. This defeat is not only ours but of more sectors, but it obviously conditions us. Our rupture with Podemos and our move to extra-parliamentarism in most of the country also significantly shrinks our field of work. However, having maintained coherence, having sown positions, and having maintained organisational and political independence allows us to endure and to prepare for new situations.

In numbers we increased our size in a humble way (with ups and downs), leaving with perhaps 30 percent more comrades than what we entered with. Unlike, for example, the Argentinian crisis of 2001, the process of the Indignados and Podemos did not generate an organised militant layer among the people who participated in it and that, together with other reasons, was also an important reason for the difficulty of growing qualitatively in numbers.

What would we have done differently? We should have had more visibility of our own when we launched Podemos, much less naivety towards the manoeuvres of the clique of Iglesias and Errejón, as well as having rejected the punctual pacts that we sometimes reached with Iglesias’s faction to stop the right-wing turn of the organisation promoted by Errejón (once the alliance defeated Errejón, Iglesias applied precisely that policy).

You’ve recently written a long piece for the Spanish journal, VientoSur, titled “Points for militants reorienting themselves in slow times”.[3] Can you summarise your main arguments and your organisation’s perspectives for the coming period?

Basically what I propose is that we need a strategic rearmament of the revolutionary left that, besides updating the strong theses (workers’ government, united front, revolutionary party, transition program) goes through being able to find tactical initiatives that allow us to seek a serious implantation in the sectors of the working class of the twenty-first century with strategic strength. This varies a lot in each country, so it is necessary to undertake a rigorous study of the social formation and identify the levers of strength of the working class locally, rather than just applying general clichés. Having said this, the search for routes towards those sectors of the working class with strategic strength and the capacity to unite and lead the whole class behind them (the miners of the last century) implies a whole range of tactical developments, which in turn imply a change of methods, of languages and forms of work of a radical left often incapable of rethinking its repertoires (articles, debates in networks, appearance in demonstrations with its own banners). Sometimes the left can be more concerned with its prestige among its equally small competitors than with doing the more silent and less visible work of insertion among the class. With this I do not mean that maintaining the nuclei and the basic ideas of revolutionary Marxism is outdated, only that it is simply the starting point. But making leaps to transcend the necessary propaganda groups implies changes.

It is also necessary to have the will to develop political initiatives, which even if from extra-parliamentary positions, seek to speak to the whole society from the standpoint of the interest of the working class. There is a real risk that, as a comrade commented in a recent piece,[4] the revolutionary left remains in counter-cultural circles of young radicals or that it isolates the groups of radical workers from the rest of the class. To summarise schematically with a historical example: in the Chile of the Popular Unity [1970-73] the copper miners are the core sector of the class. The Chilean MIR, starting from a student/intellectual environment, is able to find a shortcut: it implants itself among the poor workers of the urban peripheries and from these positions it is able to provide itself with a social base with which to address the rest of the class. Not everything is straight lines. Obviously then there was a pre-revolutionary dynamic, but what is important is the way of open strategic thinking: how to break the isolation of the revolutionary left, thinking not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of strategic strength. This is just an example with many debatable points, but I believe it is necessary to get out of the rut and think boldly.

In Anticapitalistas we are trying to develop this, maintaining a work of public appearance and youth work (programmatic development, maintenance of nuclei, recruitment), and at the same time strengthening our presence and organic ties and accompanying experiences and struggles of young trade unionists in public health and in large industry where the question of eco-social transition begins to be talked about, seeking ways to approach strategic sectors of the working class and promoting union organisations in oppressed sectors of urban migrant workers involved in house-cleaning and care for the elderly.

Can you explain the relationship between Podemos and the left around Izquierda Unida and its offshoots? Were the forces around the old Communist Party any help in forming a principled left opposition to the Iglesias and Errejón cliques?

IU (the “broad party” of the CP, almost all of whose members are CP) was in a moment of timid renewal when Podemos was born. Its first reaction was defensive. While it lost a number of core cadres to the Iglesias clique and, to a lesser extent, to the Errejón clique, IU made a strong rhetorical shift to the left in the 2015 general elections. Months later, the CP leadership reached an agreement with the Iglesias leadership and went hand in hand until this year, when they broke away and supported Sumar (the new personality-driven formation around the Minister of Labour and former CP militants). However, within the IU and within the CP there were different positions (sometimes reflected in a territorial way). Although the confederal leadership (that is, the state leadership, in the structure of which the federations of the autonomous communities, especially Andalusia, have strong weight) was an accomplice of the Iglesias clique, in important places like the government in Madrid, we maintained an alliance with them against the right-wing drifts of both Iglesias and Errejón cliques. This, as I said, ended in 2019 with a defeat that weakened them and their positions internally. Although the most left-wing sectors have fought hard within the CP (40 percent in the last congress), they have supported the line of government with the PSOE. In Andalusia, IU went so far as to secretly agree with the extreme right of Vox to expel us from the parliamentary group we shared (and where we were the majority), taking advantage of bureaucratic loopholes and the maternity leave of one of our comrades to win the vote.

Autonomist currents have traditionally been strong in Spain, a fact which was reflected in the widespread anti-party common sense of the Indignados movement. How did these tendencies respond to the Podemos leadership’s overwhelmingly electoralist focus? Where do they sit today?

These currents have many varieties that are difficult to homogenise and summarise, but I will try to describe some general processes. As far as trade union currents are concerned, they were absent from the Indignados struggle. At the political level, they were an important actor in the structuring of electoral candidacies at the municipal level in 2015, their preferred scale of work, especially in some of the country’s large cities. Although they were reluctant at the launch of Podemos and elections, in general, they ended up integrating into the process a few months later. Their tradition lacks a history of strategic debates, which meant that while they were initially opposed to electoral politics, but suddenly when the tide went that way, they participated in it without any serious reflection. In places like Madrid, where they were a prominent political actor on the left (as a militant current and tradition rather than as an organic space), one sector quickly turned to populism and nourished Iñigo Errejón’s clique with cadres, and others were our allies throughout the cycle, generating some of the most interesting criticisms of the process initiated by the Indignados movement (predominance of the middle classes) but at the same time, in my opinion, without offering much strategic clarity to go forward. Right now they are in crisis, as are many militant currents, with serious difficulties of generational renewal. They suffer greatly from the partial institutionalisation of part of the nuclei of the social movements (their main breeding ground), the police closure of social centres, the lack of social struggles and, in my opinion, their refusal to form stable and explicitly political organisations.

To examine more recent dynamics, could you give our readers some background to the rise of the far-right Vox party, as well as the hardening of the Popular Party’s right wing?

Vox is the expression of the arrival of the European extreme right’s tide in Spain. Its growth has been facilitated by the defeats of the Catalan Independence Movement and Indignados-Podemos. It is in practice a split from the PP (which had always sheltered the most Francoist and fascist sectors of the right) and managed to make a leap after the rise of Spanish nationalism against Catalan independence after the referendum of 2017. At the same time they lead the opposition against feminism, thus embedding themselves in national dynamics and in those of the international alt-right. At its heart are sectors linked to big capital, as well as more locally oriented bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors, the common feature being that they were losers of globalisation (farmers, road transport companies, etc).

Vox’s ability to make an electoral leap and polarise the debate has encouraged the PP to make a hard turn to the right, shifting its internal balance in favour of its most ultra wings, such as the PP of Madrid. But the PP is also obliged to maintain a more traditional-conservative profile in other regions, which causes them complicated breakdowns. The recent electoral non-victory of the right-wing parties may lead to a curious scenario of double “right-wingisation”: Vox is in an important crisis due to the concern of the sectors of big capital that its presence will hinder clear majorities of the right. This can have the contradictory impact: the possible abandonment of the party by the sectors linked to financial capital could enable a turn towards more fascist positions within it. At the same time, the most radical sector of the PP has gained ground over the more traditional one, which has proven unable to defeat the left.

Anti-fascist slogans have historically had a strong resonance among the left and working class in the Spanish state, given the relatively recent experience of Franco’s horrific dictatorship. How has the radical left responded to try and isolate and defeat Vox and other far right forces in the Spanish state? Did the catastrophic victory of Meloni in Italy spark new interest in this issue?

The electoral leap of Vox after the elections in Andalusia in 2018 provoked dynamics of occasional mobilisations and counter-calls against Vox acts, etc. However, a good part of the parliamentary left and the majority unions opt at all times for a strategy of not feeding the troll and reject mobilisation. At the same time, they abuse the fear generated by the extreme right to justify support for PSOE as the lesser evil. The street mobilisations are relatively perfunctory and never acquire a mass character. Although they serve to contain the public presence of Vox in certain places, they are not able to represent a serious counterweight to stop its ongoing rise.

The rise of Vox means a certain increase in harassment and violence, especially towards LGTBI people and migrants. But what has increased the most is a certain level of daily harassment and the emboldening of reactionary sectors. In this area, it is the feminist movement that has had the greatest capacity to react and respond, especially young women who see a worrying increase in machismo and right-wing politics among young men. Interestingly, there is yet to be a rise in far-right squads and fascist grouplets as is classically described, but there is a dangerous dynamic expressed through the fascistisation of the police, their unions, and the judiciary. This translates into significant increases in police and judicial repression, including prison sentences for trade unionists or militants who have mobilised against Vox. This has posed additional difficulties to classic anti-fascist strategies.

Meloni’s victory has not meant a rearmament of the mobilisations against the extreme right, but I believe that, together with the conformation of autonomous and municipal governments of Vox-PP in June 2023, it has indirectly contributed to the electoral mobilisation in the general elections of July that, although it has been fundamentally towards the PSOE and then Sumar, has been provoked beyond a framing around the need to stop the far right.

Inflation, driven in large part by corporate profiteering, has seen a huge attack on working class living standards across the world. How has the PSOE-Podemos-IU coalition responded to this critical situation, and what is their relationship to the austerian institutions of the EU?

The truth is that the European ruling class learned the lessons of the previous crisis – and of the whole cycle of revolts of the last years – and has not for now launched a frontal attack against the working class, because of political reservations and also because their bourgeoisies need an injection of public funds due to their structural difficulties in maintaining their profits. Sectors like the automobile industry literally live on this. This has generated something similar to what Brenner calls “military Keynesianism, without growth or redistribution”, which has resulted, in the Spanish state, with brutal increases in military spending and with an injection of bailout funds which have basically gone into the pockets of big business, but have also allowed the financing of temporary packages of measures designed to palliate the most extreme situations. However, what the coalition government sells as a “big social shield”, is in reality temporary crumbs, which inflation leaves for nothing, and which deepen indebtedness which, in the face of the refusal to address a conflict with the elites over the distribution of wealth or at least a far-reaching tax reform, undermines the possibilities for structuralising these poor measures and will prepare the ground for more drastic adjustments.

If PSOE and their allies manage to hold on to power, what do you see as the potential flashpoints for class and social struggles in the next period?

Right now there are no clear elements to be able to make a firm forecast. The political plane is in a very tense equilibrium on very shaky ground (the small nationalist groupings might form a pact with PSOE and Sumar), which nevertheless has the real effect of partially paralysing social struggles. An imbalance on this plane can change the panorama of the class and social struggles, in the sense of displacing obstacles (friendly government syndrome, union contention, lobbying by the social movement’s organisations, national question) or also diluting illusions in the government’s capacity to undertake structural changes. However, I also do not think that we should have too much hope that an eventual change in the political and economic situation of the country would lead to an automatic reaction of the working class. The strategy of containment and co-option deployed by reformist politicians and union bureaucracies also has long term repercussions on the capacity of these actors to respond, and even the most dynamic sectors that remain outside the orbit of the friendly government are weak.

There are tough union struggles for wages in classic industrial sectors, and others in new sectors (cleaning, department stores) which are ending with partial victories and draws, but none have a major impact on the national political landscape. The citizens’ struggles and workers’ strikes in defence of the public health system are still going on without either victories or crushing defeats, as is the struggle of the pensioners. It seems likely that they will continue, as health and pension funds are the last great economic niches still to be exploited by European and North American capitalists. All these sectors have not yet suffered a general defeat and I believe that we can expect some response from them. Similarly, the ecological and feminist movements, although having been through organisational crises, continue to enjoy mass support and are relatively powerful on a mass level.

Once the financial resources of the EU that are sustaining the profits of uncompetitive companies and government aid for the poor run out, which they will, there will inevitably be harsher adjustment plans. We need to study the medium-term plans of the European bourgeoisie and be attentive to the real developments of the class struggle, and be prepared to take advantage of the interregnum. Finally, in the face of the political weakness of the workers’ movement, we should not rule out social explosions through non-traditional channels, like the yellow vests in France.


Fernandez, Brais 2023, “El impase español”, Jacobin, 18 May.

Hassan, Omar 2016, “Podemos and left populism”, Marxist Left Review, 11, Summer.

Testas, Ánxel 2023, “Apuntes militantes para reorientarse en tiempos lentos”, VientoSur, 186, 10 March.

[1] See Hassan 2016.

[2] The left describes the system established after the death of Franco as the 78 regime.

[3] Testas 2023.

[4] Fernandez 2023.

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